Ameristeel Corp v. Local Union 430 by unknown
2001 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-26-2001 
Ameristeel Corp v. Local Union 430 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001 
Recommended Citation 
"Ameristeel Corp v. Local Union 430" (2001). 2001 Decisions. 220. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001/220 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2001 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed September 26, 2001 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 








INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers 
of America, AFL-CIO, Teamsters Local 430, 
       Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 99-cv-02131) 
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell 
 
Argued November 30, 2000 
 
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, RENDELL, 
and MAGILL,* Circuit Judges 
 





* Honorable Frank J. Magill, Senior Judge of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
 
 
       Ira H. Weinstock, Esq. [ARGUED] 
       Joseph P. Milcoff, Esq. 
       Ira H. Weinstock, P.C. 
       800 North Second Street, Suite 100 
       Harrisburg, PA 17102 
        Counsel for Appellant 
 
       John G. Creech, Esq. [ARGUED] 
       D. Rangle Moody, II, Esq. 
       Haynsworth, Baldwin, Johnson & 
        Greaves 
       918 South Pleasantburg Drive 
       Greenville, SC 29607 
          -and- 
       Mark J. Manta, Esq. 
       Klett, Rooney, Lieber & Schorling 
       810 Bear Tavern Road 
       Mountain View Office Park, 
        Suite 302 
       West Trenton, NJ 08628 
        Counsel for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This appeal presents the question whether a successor 
employer who has expressly refused to be bound by its 
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement may 
nonetheless be forced to arbitrate grievances pertaining to 
the agreement. Because an unconsenting successor cannot 
be bound by the substantive provisions of its predecessor's 
agreement, we hold that the successor in this case, appellee 
AmeriSteel Corporation, cannot be forced to arbitrate the 
extent of its obligations under the agreement. AmeriSteel, 
quite simply, has no obligations under the agreement-- 
and thus no arbitration award for the appellant, Teamsters 
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Local 430, could possibly receive judicial sanction. In such 
circumstances, the arbitration forum designated in the 
collective bargaining agreement is an inappropriate vehicle 
by which to settle the parties' dispute. Therefore, we will 
affirm the District Court's order which enjoins the Union 
and the American Arbitration Association from including 
AmeriSteel as a party in pending arbitration proceedings, or 
any other arbitration proceedings involving the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
 
Our resolution of this case avoids creating the 
incongruous situation in which a successor employer may 
be forced to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its 
predecessor's agreement, and yet the arbitrator is powerless 
to enforce these obligations because they are not binding 
on the successor employer. While we recognize the vital 
importance of arbitration as a means of settling labor 
disputes, we think it clear that arbitration should not 
proceed when ultimately it can serve no purpose. 
Furthermore, our decision recognizes the sound principle 
that arbitration cannot be used as a means to accomplish 
illegitimate ends. More specifically, given that AmeriSteel 
has no obligations under the collective bargaining 
agreement, any arbitration award to the appellant Union 
would necessarily reach beyond the agreement itself and 
into the realm of the arbitrator's own notion of industrial 
justice, a practice expressly forbidden by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
 
II. Facts and Procedural Background 
 
Appellee AmeriSteel is a Florida corporation engaged in 
the manufacture and sale of steel products. On April 29, 
1999, AmeriSteel purchased various assets of Brocker 
Rebar, including a manufacturing facility in York, 
Pennsylvania, and AmeriSteel commenced operations at the 
York facility on May 3, 1999. Appellant Teamsters Local 
430 ("Local 430" or "Union") represents certain employees 
at the facility, namely truck drivers, warehousemen, 
material handlers, and other helpers. A collective 
bargaining agreement ("CBA") existed between Local 430 
and Brocker Rebar, effective from December 1, 1996 to 
November 30, 1999. The purchase agreement between 
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AmeriSteel and Brocker Rebar included various provisions 
expressly stating that AmeriSteel was not to be bound by 
the terms of the CBA. In its dealings with the Union, 
AmeriSteel has consistently and repeatedly maintained that 
it is not bound by the terms of the CBA, and therefore that 
it is not bound to arbitrate under the agreement. 
 
AmeriSteel hired roughly 50 employees to work in the 
York facility, and all but six members of Local 430 who had 
worked for Brocker Rebar were hired by AmeriSteel. In 
addition, AmeriSteel retained four Brocker Rebar 
executives. Because it had hired a majority of the Local 430 
members who had worked for Brocker Rebar, AmeriSteel 
was obligated to bargain with the Union. Bargaining with 
the Union broke down, however, on May 10, 1999, when 
AmeriSteel withdrew recognition of the Union based on a 
petition purportedly signed by a majority of the Union 
employees, in which they supposedly stated that they no 
longer wanted to be represented by Local 430. The Union 
then initiated an unfair labor practices action against 
AmeriSteel before the NLRB, but that action is not before 
us on appeal. 
 
Local 430 filed a grievance on behalf of all its members 
against Brocker Rebar and AmeriSteel on April 22, 1999, 
challenging unilateral changes that would occur in working 
conditions at the York facility when the AmeriSteel 
purchase agreement was consummated. Closing under the 
purchase agreement occurred on April 29, 1999. In May 
1999, after the parties were unable to resolve the grievance, 
the Union requested arbitration pursuant to the arbitration 
clause in the CBA. AmeriSteel filed a Complaint and motion 
for injunctive relief in the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania on December 9, 1999, 
seeking to enjoin Local 430 and the American Arbitration 
Association from proceeding to arbitration with AmeriSteel 
as a party. On March 17, 2000, the District Court granted 
AmeriSteel a preliminary injunction, reasoning that 
AmeriSteel could not be bound to arbitrate under the pre- 
existing CBA because AmeriSteel was not the "alter ego" of 
Brocker Rebar, nor had AmeriSteel agreed to abide by the 
CBA. App. at 256-57. 
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Local 430 complains on appeal that the District Court 
should not have granted the preliminary injunction in the 
first place, and that the court compounded its error by, in 
effect, granting a permanent injunction without analyzing 
the applicable standard for granting a permanent 
injunction. Unfortunately, the District Court might have 
caused some unnecessary confusion by not explicitly 
stating that it was, in fact, granting a permanent 
injunction, and not merely a preliminary one. We have in 
the past admonished district courts to avoid this type of 
oversight. E.g., CIBA-GEIGY Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 747 
F.2d 844, 847 (3d Cir. 1985) (observing that although the 
Third Circuit could convert the district court's opinion into 
a permanent injunction, "we would much prefer that the 
district court recast its own opinion in the language of the 
standard it is applying. This would eliminate the possibility 
of confusion as to what the district court intended and 
would, in the long run, promote judicial economy"). 
 
Nonetheless, it is apparent that the District Court 
implicitly granted a permanent injunction, and we find no 
reversible error in the court's procedure. In its opinion, the 
District Court announced a legal standard under which 
Local 430 could prevail only if it could prove that 
AmeriSteel was the "alter ego" of Brocker Rebar, or that 
AmeriSteel had agreed to abide by the CBA. It is 
undisputed that AmeriSteel is not the "alter ego"1 of 
Brocker Rebar and that AmeriSteel has expressly rejected 
the CBA. Thus, there were no triable issues of fact and no 
need for a trial on the merits. In other words, AmeriSteel 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Under the "alter ego" doctrine, a successor employer "is subject to all 
the legal and contractual obligations of the predecessor" when the 
successor is a mere "alter ego" of the predecessor, or nothing more than 
"a disguised continuance of the old employer." NLRB v. Omnitest 
Inspection Servs., 937 F.2d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 1991). An "alter ego" 
relationship exists "when there is a mere technical change in the 
structure or identity of the old employing entity, frequently to avoid the 
effect of the labor laws, without any substantial change in its ownership 
or management." Id. As the District Court observed, AmeriSteel's 
purchase of Brocker Rebar was a transaction involving two unrelated 
parties, and there "has been no suggestion that AmeriSteel is a sham or 
alter ego of Brocker Rebar." App. at 255. 
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had already prevailed on the merits, and therefore the 
District Court's order, in effect, grants AmeriSteel a 
permanent injunction. Any further proceedings in the 
District Court would have served no purpose. 
Consequently, we are squarely presented with the question 
of whether AmeriSteel can be bound to arbitrate under the 
CBA. 
 
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 29 U.S.C.S 185. Because 
the District Court's order, in effect, grants a permanent 
injunction, we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291, which provides for appeals of all final 
decisions of the federal district courts. 
 
We review a district court's decision to grant or deny a 
permanent injunction under an abuse of discretion 
standard. E.g., ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 
84 F.3d 1471, 1476 (3d Cir. 1996). However, because an 
abuse of discretion exists where the district court's decision 
"rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to 





This case requires us to navigate the treacherous waters 
of the Supreme Court's labor law successorship doctrine, 
which has, at times, imposed extra-contractual duties upon 
successor employers. Appellant Local 430 argues that 
AmeriSteel, as a successor employer to Brocker Rebar, 
must arbitrate grievances brought by the Union under the 
collective bargaining agreement between the Union and 
Brocker Rebar. AmeriSteel counters that it was never a 
party to the CBA, expressly rejected it during its asset 
purchase negotiations with Brocker Rebar, and has 
consistently maintained in its dealings with the Union that 
it is not bound by the terms of the CBA, including its 
arbitration clause. Accordingly, AmeriSteel argues that it 
cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration. 
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As an initial matter, we note that labeling AmeriSteel a 
"successor employer" to Brocker Rebar does little to help 
resolve the issue in this case. As the Supreme Court has 
explained, a new employer, like AmeriSteel, "may be a 
successor for some purposes and not for others," and the 
question whether AmeriSteel is a successor to Brocker 
Rebar "is simply not meaningful in the abstract." Howard 
Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 
249, 262 n.9 (1974). Accordingly, the question we must ask 
is: what are the legal obligations of AmeriSteel to the 
employees of Brocker Rebar? Id. Or more specifically: does 
AmeriSteel have a duty to arbitrate with the Union under 
the CBA? As the District Court correctly noted, the 
resolution of that latter question depends, in large part, on 
the proper interpretation of three decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court: John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston , 376 U.S. 
543 (1964), NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, 
Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972), and Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel 
and Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974). 
 
While other courts have tried to make sense of these 
three opinions, we find no analysis that charts a perfect 
course that we can readily follow. Accordingly, we will make 
our own way through the progression of the Supreme 
Court's reasoning. As the dissent points out, it is 
unfortunate that the law in this area is unsettled, and 
ultimately, only the Supreme Court can silence the conflict 
that exists in the troubled trilogy of Wiley, Burns, and 
Howard Johnson. Given the tension that exists in this 
trilogy, no approach to reconciling these cases will be 
completely satisfying. Nevertheless, we think it significant 
that, as discussed below, our ultimate result (and the logic 
that underpins it) is supported by the majority of courts 
that have articulated the contours of labor law 
successorship. 
 
In Wiley, the Court introduced the idea that a successor 
employer could be bound by an arbitration clause in a 
collective bargaining agreement between the predecessor 
employer and its unionized employees. The predecessor 
employer, Interscience, had merged with John Wiley & 
Sons, and ceased to do business as a separate entity. The 
Union then brought suit against Wiley to compel arbitration 
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under the collective bargaining agreement. Wiley , 376 U.S. 
at 544-45. The Court posed the legal issue as follows: 
"whether Wiley, which did not itself sign the collective 
bargaining agreement on which the Union's claim to 
arbitration depends, is bound at all by the agreement's 
arbitration provision." Id. at 547. The Court answered this 
question in the affirmative. Id. at 550-51. 
 
The Court acknowledged that "the principles of law 
governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a contract 
an unconsenting successor to a contracting party," but 
distinguished the case at hand by explaining that"a 
collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary 
contract." Id. at 550. The Court grounded this extra- 
contractual duty in federal law -- specifically,"the policy of 
our national labor laws," id. at 548, which recognized both 
the "central role of arbitration" and the importance of 
"protect[ing] . . . employees from a sudden change in the 
employment relationship," id. at 549. Thus, the Court 
explained, "the impressive policy considerations favoring 
arbitration are not wholly overborne by the fact that Wiley 
did not sign the contract being construed." Id. at 550. 
 
The Court's holding is actually quite limited: 
 
       We hold that the disappearance by merger of a 
       corporate employer which has entered into a collective 
       bargaining agreement with a union does not 
       automatically terminate all rights of the employees 
       covered by the agreement, and that, in appropriate 
       circumstances, present here, the successor employer 
       may be required to arbitrate with the union under the 
       agreement. 
 
376 U.S. at 548. 
 
The Court then went on to note that "[w]e do not hold 
that in every case in which the ownership or corporate 
structure of an enterprise is changed the duty to arbitrate 
survives." Id. at 551. Rather, factors such as lack of 
"substantial continuity of identity in the business 
enterprise" before and after the change could alter the 
result; so could the parties' conduct, if, for instance, the 
union fails to continue to make its claims known. Id. 
Without continuity, the duty to arbitrate would be 
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"something imposed from without, not reasonably to be 
found in the particular bargaining agreement and the acts 
of the parties involved." Id. Thus, the"substantial 
continuity" concept -- first alluded to by the Court after it 
announced its holding -- should properly be viewed as a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the imposition 
of arbitration on an unconsenting successor. 
 
The Court also observed that "[o]f course, the Union may 
not use arbitration to acquire new rights against Wiley" that 
were not grounded in the collective bargaining agreement 
itself. Id. at 555. Whether the Union's demands had merit 
was for the arbitrator to decide in light of the facts, yet 
arbitration would be inappropriate if "it can be seen in 
advance that no award to the Union could receive judicial 
sanction." Id. Such was not the case in Wiley -- because 
the Union's demands were not "plainly unreasonable" -- 
and therefore the Court permitted the demands to proceed 
to arbitration. Id. 
 
Although the Wiley holding, strictly speaking, addresses 
only the duty to arbitrate, we have in the past noted that 
a necessary implication of Wiley's holding is that Wiley, the 
successor employer, could possibly be bound by the 
substantive terms of the CBA. E.g., Local Union No. 249 v. 
Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d 956, 960 (3d Cir. 1974). This 
conclusion "is manifest from the fact that the very question 
upon which the successor must, under Wiley, submit to 
arbitration, is the extent to which the other terms of the 
predecessor's contract are binding on the successor." Id. at 
960 n.20. If Wiley could not possibly be bound by the 
substantive terms of the CBA, arbitration would be a wholly 
pointless exercise. Moreover, if the terms could not possibly 
be enforced against Wiley, then no arbitration award to the 
Union "could receive judicial sanction," and thus the Wiley 
Court would not have permitted the case to proceed to 
arbitration in the first place. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 555. 
 
In Burns, the Supreme Court took a very different 
approach to the issue of whether a successor employer 
could be bound by the substantive terms of its 
predecessor's CBA. The predecessor employer, the 
Wackenhut Corporation, had provided plant protection 
services at a Lockheed Aircraft Service plant for several 
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years before the successor, Burns International Security 
Services, took over this task after outbidding Wackenhut 
for the security contract. Burns, 406 U.S. at 274-75. A 
majority of the employees hired by Burns had been 
employed by Wackenhut, but Burns refused to honor the 
existing CBA between Wackenhut and these employees. The 
Union then filed an unfair labor practice charge with the 
NLRB, and the Board ordered Burns to comply with the 
CBA executed by Wackenhut. Id. at 275-77. 
 
In reversing the NLRB, the Supreme Court endorsed the 
Board's earlier, consistently-held interpretation that 
successor employers could not be bound against their will 
by the substantive terms of existing CBAs. Id.  at 285-91. 
Specifically, the Burns Court noted that: 
 
       These considerations, evident from the explicit 
       language and legislative history of the labor laws, 
       underlay the Board's prior decisions, which until now 
       have consistently held that, although successor 
       employers may be bound to recognize and bargain with 
       the union, they are not bound by the substantive 
       provisions of a collective-bargaining contract negotiated 
       by their predecessors but not agreed to or assumed by 
       them. 
 
Id. at 284 (emphasis added). 
 
In reaching its decision, the Burns Court stated that the 
federal labor policy of preventing industrial strife did not 
outweigh "the bargaining freedom of employers and 
unions." Id. at 287. Therefore Burns, which had "in no way 
agreed" to the existing CBA, could not be compelled to 
accept contract provisions against its will. Id.  at 282, 287. 
Moreover, the Court reasoned, forcing either a union or a 
successor employer to be bound by the substantive terms 
of an old CBA "may result in serious inequities." Id. at 287. 
For example, saddling successor employers with the terms 
and conditions contained in old CBAs "may discourage and 
inhibit the transfer of capital" because many potential 
employers will be willing to rescue moribund businesses 
only if they can negotiate their own CBAs. Id.  at 287-88. 
Additionally, a union may have made concessions to a 
small or economically-troubled predecessor employer that it 
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would not be willing to make to a large or economically 
powerful successor. Id. at 288. In sum, the balance of 
bargaining advantage between employers and labor should 
"be set by economic power realities," and the federal labor 
policy of avoiding industrial strife would be ill-served by 
binding either employers or employees to contract terms 
that "do not correspond to the relative economic strength of 
the parties." Id. 
 
Wiley and Burns, therefore, appear to be in direct 
conflict. On the one hand, the holding in Wiley  necessarily 
implies that unconsenting successor employers may be 
bound by the substantive terms of pre-existing CBAs. But 
on the other hand, Burns endorses the idea that unwilling 
successors cannot be bound by such terms. As the 
principal means of distinguishing these two cases, the 
Burns Court offered the somewhat unsatisfying distinction 
that Wiley arose in the context of a suit to compel 
arbitration, whereas Burns involved an unfair labor practice 
proceeding in front of the NLRB.2Id. at 285-86. Not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Burns Court also suggested that Wiley and Burns could be 
distinguished on the basis that Wiley involved a merger, which triggered 
the general state law rule "that in merger situations the surviving 
corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing 
corporation." 
Burns, 406 U.S. at 286. In Wiley, the Court had noted that the union's 
argument -- which may well have influenced its specific holding -- was 
based on principles of corporate consolidation. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48 
("The Union relies on S 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, . . . which 
provides, among other things, that no `claim or demand for any cause' 
against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a 
consolidation."). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this 
distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, yet the 
Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a 
successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing 
Corp. 
v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n.10 (1987) (noting that "the way in which a 
successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not 
determinative" of the successor's labor law obligations); see also Golden 
State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973) (observing that 
"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of successorship" are not 
confined by the boundaries of state corporation law, and that "[t]he 
refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish 
among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets" is due to the 
fact that as long as there is "continuity in the employing industry, the 
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surprisingly, in the aftermath of Burns, courts struggled to 
reconcile Burns with Wiley, and could do little more than 
repeat the Supreme Court's emphasis on the procedural 
distinction between the two cases. E.g., Bill's Trucking, 493 
F.2d at 961 (noting that "it was specifically emphasized in 
Burns that Wiley arose in the context of a . . . suit to 
compel arbitration, not in the context of an unfair labor 
practice proceeding," and that "Burns, then, cannot be read 
to foreclose absolutely the imposition upon a successor 
employer of the contract obligations entered into by its 
predecessor"). 
 
It is against this backdrop that, just two years after 
Burns, the Supreme Court took up the issue of labor law 
successorship in Howard Johnson. The Court began by 
acknowledging the conflicting reasoning of Wiley  and 
Burns, but rejected the idea that the cases could be 
distinguished on the basis of their procedural context, 
because distinguishing the cases in this manner would 
inappropriately "permit the rights enjoyed by the new 
employer in a successorship context to depend upon the 
forum in which the union presses its claims." Howard 
Johnson, 417 U.S. at 256. With this distinction repudiated, 
the Howard Johnson Court appeared to be squarely faced 
with an irreconcilable conflict between Wiley  and Burns: 
either the substantive terms of an existing CBA could be 
imposed against an unconsenting successor, as is implicit 
in Wiley, or they could not, as stated by Burns. 
 
The Howard Johnson Court, however, chose not to deal 
with this conflict, and instead walked a very narrow path. 
Rather than deciding "whether there is any irreconcilable 
conflict between Wiley and Burns," the Court decided the 
case on the ground that "even on its own terms, Wiley does 
not support the decision of the courts below," which had 
compelled the successor employer, Howard Johnson, to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
public policies underlying the doctrine will be served by its broad 
application"). We have ourselves implicitly indicated that no special 
significance should be attached to the fact that Wiley involved a merger. 
E.g., Bill's Trucking, 493 F.2d at 957-61 (applying Wiley in the context 
of 
a sale of capital stock). 
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submit to arbitration pursuant to a CBA between its 
unionized employees and the predecessor employer, the 
Grissoms. Id. at 256. In other words, even on its own 
terms, Wiley did not compel the conclusion that Howard 
Johnson must proceed to arbitration against its will, and 
likewise could not justify imposing the substantive terms of 
the CBA against Howard Johnson. 
 
The Howard Johnson Court contrasted the facts of its 
case with Wiley, noting that the most important distinction 
is that in Wiley, "the surviving corporation hired all the 
employees of the disappearing corporation," whereas in 
Howard Johnson the successor "hired only nine of the 53 
former Grissom employees and none of the Grissom 
supervisors." Id. at 258, 260. The Court emphasized that, 
because Howard Johnson had hired so few of the Grissom 
employees, there was no "substantial continuity in the 
identity of the work force across the change in ownership," 
which placed the case outside the realm of Wiley . Id. at 
262-63. Wiley had stated that the lack  of "substantial 
continuity" would remove the situation from the ambit of its 
holding, and the lack of substantial continuity thus 
dictated the result. 
 
It is important, for the purposes of this appeal, to 
appreciate the limited scope of the Court's decision in 
Howard Johnson. As explained above, the Court did not 
reconcile the conflict between Wiley and Burns. The 
Howard Johnson Court simply pointed out that, consistent 
with Wiley, and on Wiley's own terms, the lack of 
substantial continuity meant that the Court needed to look 
no further. Accordingly, Howard Johnson does not bridge 
the gap between Wiley and Burns, nor does it establish 
broadly applicable guiding principles that should be 




3. Our main point of disagreement with our dissenting colleague is in our 
view that Howard Johnson's focus on substantial continuity does not 
make it the sole basis for finding a continuing duty to arbitrate or 
making agreements binding, but, rather, as one sine qua non. There is 
a difference: while the existence of substantial continuity is a necessary 
ingredient, its presence does not necessarily render the new entity 
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Still, Howard Johnson does give some indication as to the 
Court's thinking on the conflict between Wiley  and Burns. 
Throughout the opinion, the Court downplays the 
significance of Wiley, describing its holding as a "guarded, 
almost tentative statement," id. at 256, and focusing on the 
limited factual context in which Wiley arose, id. at 256-64. 
In contrast, the Court takes an expansive view of Burns, 
repeatedly extolling its reasoning. Stating at the outset that 
"[c]learly the reasoning of Burns must be taken into 
account here," id. at 256, the Howard Johnson Court goes 
on to observe that "[w]hat the Union seeks here is 
completely at odds with the basic principles this Court 
elaborated in Burns," id. at 261, and that the reasoning in 
Burns "established that Howard Johnson had the right not 
to hire any of the former Grissom employees, if it so 
desired," id. at 262. In short, the best reading of Howard 
Johnson is that it does not resolve the conflict between 
Wiley and Burns, but it does much to strengthen and 
reaffirm the reasoning of Burns, and certainly does nothing 
to call into question Burns' assertion that successor 
employers "are not bound by the substantive provisions of 
a collective-bargaining contract negotiated by their 
predecessors but not agreed to or assumed by them." 
Burns, 406 U.S. at 284. 
 
Nevertheless, one might argue (at least in theory) that 
Burns has somehow been modified by Howard Johnson, 
based on the reasoning that Howard Johnson's emphasis 
on "substantial continuity in the identity of the work force" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
bound. (If one is not 35 years of age, one cannot be President of the 
United States; this is a sine qua non. However, if one is 35 years of age, 
he or she does not necessarily qualify. Being a native-born citizen is 
another sine qua non, in fact.) The difficulty, having explored the three 
"guiding" cases, is that we must determine what are all the sine qua 
nons. We cannot subscribe to the dissent's view that these cases equate 
substantial continuity with successorship or "mandates" such a finding 
here. Clearly, as Wiley itself indicates, other factors must also be 
considered. See Wiley, 376 U.S. at 551. Burns says that contractual 
understandings are important, but the dissent discredits that concept. 
While we concede that the scope of the directive of Burns may not be 
crystal-clear, we suggest that the directives of Wiley and Howard 
Johnson are clearly narrower than the dissent's view would allow. 
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necessarily implies that if such "substantial continuity" 
does exist, then arbitration under the existing CBA would 
be appropriate. And if such arbitration were to go forward, 
it follows that the substantive terms of the CBA could be 
enforced, and thus Burns cannot survive intact.4 
 
In our view, however, this reading of Howard Johnson 
would stretch its carefully circumscribed holding beyond 
recognition. As explained above, the holding in Howard 
Johnson does nothing more than simply point out that on 
the facts of the case, not even Wiley (and certainly not 
Burns) could justify forcing Howard Johnson to submit to 
arbitration against its will. In other words, because the 
Court was able to base its result on the lack of"substantial 
continuity," it simply did not reach the issue of whether, 
had there been "substantial continuity," the successor 
employer would have been forced to arbitrate and 
necessarily could have been bound by the substantive 
terms of the CBA. Indeed, nothing in the Howard Johnson 
opinion calls into question either the reasoning or the 
holding of Burns -- as explained above, there is much in 
the opinion that reaffirms Burns -- and thus we cannot 
accept any interpretation of Howard Johnson that either 
explicitly or implicitly modifies Burns' conclusion that a 
successor employer cannot be bound against its will by the 
substantive provisions of its predecessor's CBA. Here, the 
parties specifically agreed that the CBA would not be 
binding, and Burns teaches that we must respect that 
agreement. 
 
Our reading of Burns and Howard Johnson  is confirmed 
by the Supreme Court's observations in Fall River Dyeing & 
Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987). In reviewing 
the principles of labor law successorship, the Court 
reiterated Burns' assertion that "the successor . . . is not 
bound by the substantive provisions of the predecessor's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. While the dissent does not frame its argument in precisely these 
terms, nonetheless this reasoning is implicit in the dissent's conclusion 
that "there is sufficient `substantial continuity of identity in the 
business 
enterprise,' between Brocker Rebar and AmeriSteel to justify holding that 
AmeriSteel is bound to the arbitration provision (and possibly to the 
substantive provisions) of Brocker Rebar's CBA with Local 430." 
Dissenting Op. at 37. 
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collective-bargaining agreement."5 Fall River, 482 U.S. at 40 
(citing Burns, 406 U.S. at 284). Significantly, in the very 
next sentence, the Court cited Howard Johnson , so it 
cannot be argued that the Fall River Court somehow 
overlooked Howard Johnson when reaffirming Burns. 
Rather, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that after 
Howard Johnson, Burns rests on solid ground. 
 
This conclusion, however, serves to illuminate the 
perplexing issue presented by this appeal -- namely, that 
while the validity of Burns cannot be doubted, Burns 
nonetheless conflicts with the implications of Wiley. The 
most we can say with assurance regarding this conflict is 
that while the contours of Wiley are narrow, and its status 
not entirely clear, Burns' language and logic have been 
reinforced in later cases. Accordingly, we believe the clear 
mandate of Burns -- that an unconsenting successor 
employer cannot be bound by the substantive terms of a 
CBA negotiated by its predecessor -- provides more 
persuasive guidance than the limited holding in Wiley. That 
being the case, AmeriSteel cannot be bound by the 
substantive terms of the CBA at issue here, which was 
negotiated between Brocker Rebar and the Union and 
which AmeriSteel's purchase agreement specifically stated 
would not be binding on it. And because AmeriSteel cannot 
be bound by the substantive terms of the CBA, no 
arbitration award to the Union -- which, of course, would 
be based on the substantive terms of the CBA -- could 
receive judicial sanction, and therefore AmeriSteel cannot 




5. The dissent attempts to downplay the significance of this statement by 
characterizing it as a "cryptic piece of dicta." Dissenting Op. at 36 n.2. 
While it is arguably dicta, there certainly is nothing "cryptic" about it. 
This is a simple, straightforward statement that makes a general 
observation about successors, taken almost word-for-word from Burns. 
The dissent would re-write the statement as referring to only "Burns-type 
successors," but we see no reason to believe that the Fall River Court 
meant anything other than what it said. 
 
6. In reaching this conclusion, we are not, as the dissent appears to 
indicate, overstepping our authority as a lower federal court by 
"emasculat[ing] Wiley." Dissenting Op. at 28. Rather, when faced with a 
 
                                16 
 
 
While there is no directly controlling authority in our 
Circuit, nonetheless we think the result that we reach here 
flows logically from our existing Circuit precedent. For 
example, in Stardyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 
1994), we observed that a successor has an obligation to 
recognize and bargain with the union that represented its 
predecessor's employees, but that a successor is"not 
bound by its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement." 
Id. at 145 n.3. Similarly, in Pick-Mt. Laurel Corp. v. NLRB, 
625 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1980), we noted that when analyzing 
labor law successorship, the Supreme Court has held"that 
a successor does not stand in the same shoes as its 
predecessor because it will not be bound to the previously 
bargained for terms, [and] the Court construed the relevant 
policies to prevent imposing on the successor an obligation 
to be bound by past events and arrangements." Id. at 484. 
And, as explained above, if AmeriSteel cannot be bound by 
these "past events and arrangements" in the form of 
Brocker Rebar's CBA, then it necessarily follows that 
arbitration under the CBA is inappropriate because no 
award for the Union "could receive judicial sanction."7 
Wiley, 376 U.S. at 555. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
body of Supreme Court precedent that is, as the dissent points out, 
"discordant in [ ] overall tone and approach," id. at 24, we are simply 
choosing what we believe to be the best interpretation. And in so doing, 
we are performing our appropriate role as a federal appellate tribunal in 
the most basic sense. (The dissenting opinion arguably emasculates 
Burns in similar fashion when it urges that the sales agent expressly 
repudiating the CBA is "irrelevant to the analysis." Dissenting Op. at 
32.) 
 
Moreover, we do not agree that our result in this case necessarily 
emasculates Wiley, or relegates it "to the dustbin of history," Dissenting 
Op. at 30, although we do decline to give Wiley  as broad a reading as 
does Chief Judge Becker. We suggest that one who reads Wiley on its 
own, start to finish, would be struck by its careful and restrictive 
analysis, which leads to its equally narrow holding, which we quoted 
above, that collective bargaining agreement provisions do not 
automatically go by the wayside when a corporate consolidation occurs. 
Wiley, 376 U.S. at 548. 
 
7. Several other cases in our Circuit have addressed the labor law 
successorship doctrine, but we find these decisions of limited utility. 
For 
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Moreover, we find it significant that our resolution of this 
case is supported by the decisions of our sister circuit 
courts of appeals. Indeed, in the time since Fall River, every 
one of our sister circuits that has addressed the issue has 
concluded that an unconsenting successor employer cannot 
be bound by the substantive terms of an existing CBA.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
example, in Local Union No. 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d 956 (3d 
Cir. 1974), we addressed Wiley and Burns , but we distinguished the two 
cases based on their procedural distinction. Id.  at 961. As explained 
above, the Court has since rejected this means of distinguishing the 
cases. Supra p. 13. In American Bell Inc. v. Federation of Telephone 
Workers, 736 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1984), we touched upon the 
successorship doctrine, but ultimately did not reach the issue because 
we concluded that the doctrine did not apply. Id. at 888. And in 
Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d 66 (3d 
Cir. 1988), we construed Burns somewhat narrowly, but we think it 
unwise to place any particular emphasis on this case. As a case 
primarily concerned with the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, Cement 
Express did not give labor law successorship a thorough treatment, as 
evidenced by the fact that in our discussion, we did not mention Howard 
Johnson or Fall River. Id. at 69. Moreover, in distinguishing Wiley and 
Burns, we relied on the procedural distinction between the two cases 
that the Court has repudiated. Id. 
 
In concluding that AmeriSteel had no duty to arbitrate, the District 
Court appeared principally to rely upon our decision in NLRB v. Phoenix 
Pipe & Tube, 955 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1991), which the District Court 
characterized as standing for the proposition that"by retaining the 
workforce of a prior employer, a subsequent employer becomes obligated 
to bargain with a union, but not to abide by the collective bargaining 
agreement." App. at 257. This is a puzzling statement, however, because 
Phoenix Pipe does not support this proposition, and the District Court 
included no supporting citation to the case. Given that Phoenix Pipe says 
nothing regarding a successor's obligations under its predecessor's CBA, 
we conclude that the case is not relevant to the issues presented by this 
appeal. Accordingly, while we agree with the District Court's ultimate 
conclusion that AmeriSteel cannot be compelled to arbitrate, we disagree 
with the reasoning that the District Court employed to arrive at that 
result. 
 
8. The dissent states that the case law from other courts of appeals "cuts 
in both directions," Dissenting Op. at 38, but, we cannot agree. It 
references only two appellate cases that supposedly cut in its favor, id. 
at 38 n.4, but neither case is particularly relevant. Boeing Co. v. 
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E.g., Local 7-517 v. Uno-Ven Co., 170 F.3d 779, 781 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (stating that when a successor purchases a 
predecessor's business, the successor "would not be bound 
by the collective bargaining contract"); NLRB v. Hosp. San 
Rafael, Inc., 42 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 1994) (observing that 
"[w]here, for example, a unionized business is acquired by 
a new owner unaffiliated with the old one, the new 
employer may not be bound by a collective bargaining 
agreement with the old one"); Southward v. S. Cent. Ready 
Mix Supply Corp., 7 F.3d 487, 495 (6th Cir. 1993) (asserting 
that the Supreme Court has "repeatedly recognized that a 
successor corporation may be bound by the substantive 
terms of its predecessor's CBA only if the successor is the 
alter ego of the predecessor or the successor has expressly 
or impliedly assumed the obligations of its predecessor's 
contract"); Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890, 895 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992) (noting that "[w]hile a successor has a duty to 
bargain with an incumbent union, it is not bound by the 
substantive terms of the previously negotiated collective- 
bargaining agreement"); New England Mech., Inc. v. Local 
Union 294, 909 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining 
that a successor employer "is not bound by its 
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement," and that 
"the Supreme Court has continually indicated that a 
successor employer is only bound to bargain with a union 
which had a CBA with the predecessor"). District courts in 
our Circuit have come to the same conclusion. E.g., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 504 F.2d 
307 (5th Cir. 1974), predates Fall River, and therefore is of limited 
utility. 
And in Stotter Division of Graduate Plastics Co. v. District 65, 991 F.2d 
997 (2d Cir. 1993), the court based its determination that Stotter was a 
successor employer not only on continuity, but also on the fact that the 
obligations at issue arose before the transfer, and the fact that Stotter 
had "entered into an agreement with the Union which adopted (with 
immaterial exceptions) the provisions of the [CBA]." Id. at 1002. Thus, 
Stotter is not persuasive on this issue. The dissent can cite no post-Fall 
River case in our sister circuits that has bound an unconsenting 
successor employer to the substantive provisions of an existing CBA. We 
submit there are none. Indeed, were the dissent's interpretation to 
prevail, it would place us squarely at odds with every court of appeals to 
consider this issue, as noted above. 
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Philadelphia Joint Bd. v. After Six, Inc., No. 92-4294, 1992 
WL 202166, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 1992) (maintaining that 
"if an employer takes over another business, the employer 
is not bound by its predecessor's collective bargaining 
agreements. At most, the employer will be required to 
bargain with any unions that the predecessor employer had 
recognized."); Local Union No. 4 v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 758 
F.Supp. 962, 973 (D.N.J. 1991) (observing that "[u]nder 
Wiley and Burns, although [the successor] had an 
obligation to recognize and bargain with the Union .. . [the 
successor] could not be required to assume [the 
predecessor's] labor contract"). Additionally, many 
commentators are in accord. E.g., Burton F. Boltuch, 
Workplace Closures and Company Reorganizations: 
Enforcing NLRB, Contract and Noncontract Claims and 
Obligations, 7 Lab. Law. 53, 78 (1991) (explaining that 
"[c]ourts and arbitrators since Burns do not hold the 
`unconsenting' successor to the CBA"); Claiborne Barksdale, 
Successor Liability Under the National Labor Relations Act 
and Title VII, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 707, 711 (1976) (arguing that 
a "successor will not be bound . . . by the substantive 
terms of the predecessor's contract with the employees 
unless it either explicitly or impliedly ratifies the 
agreement"); Wilson McLeod, Rekindling Labor Law 
Successorship in an Era of Decline, 11 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 
271, 308-09 (1974) (explaining that "courts are firmly 
opposed" to enforcing the substantive terms of a 
predecessor's CBA against a successor, and that if the 
Burns holding rests on solid footing, then "there is no 
principled reason why successors should be forced to 
arbitrate at all"). 
 
Given the prevailing case law supporting our view, and 
given the teachings of Wiley and Burns  that expose the 
futility and inappropriateness of arbitration when the 
substantive terms of the bargaining agreement cannot be 
binding on the new entity, we are curious as to what 
purpose is to be served by arbitration? How can we hold, as 
the dissent would, that such a pointless exercise is 
mandated, especially given the fact that the specific 
contractual provisions between the parties did  in fact not 
merely "shed" the prior agreement containing the 
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arbitration provisions, but specifically contracted them 
away? 
 
Finally, we think it is important to note that our decision 
in this case does not overlook the vital importance of 
arbitration as a means of settling labor disputes. We have 
in the past observed that federal labor law elevates labor 
arbitrators "to an exalted status," Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. 
v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1969), and that 
"courts play an extremely limited role in resolving labor 
disputes," News Am. Publ'n, Inc. v. Newark Typographical 
Union, Local 103, 918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, 
an arbitration award must be enforced "[a]s long as the 
arbitrator has arguably construed or applied the contract," 
News Am., 918 F.2d at 24 (emphasis in original), which is 
in accord with the Supreme Court's instruction that an 
arbitration award is legitimate as long as it "draws its 
essence from the collective bargaining agreement," United 
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 
(1987). 
 
What distinguishes this case, however, is that because 
AmeriSteel cannot be bound by the substantive terms of 
the CBA between Brocker Rebar and the Union, there 
simply is no contract for the arbitrator to construe. While 
we must respect the vital role that arbitration plays in 
settling labor disputes (and the correspondingly broad 
authority granted to arbitrators), we think it goes without 
saying that courts should not compel parties to submit to 
arbitration when there is nothing to arbitrate. To hold 
otherwise would create the paradoxical situation in which 
AmeriSteel would be forced to arbitrate the extent of its 
obligations under the CBA, and yet, because it has no such 
obligations, the arbitrator would be powerless to enforce 
these obligations. 
 
One might argue that even though AmeriSteel has no 
obligations under the CBA, this case should still proceed to 
arbitration on the theory that an arbitrator could 
conceivably grant an award to the Union based on some 
general sense of equity or fairness. Even granting this 
possibility, such an award would be illegitimate because it 
would "simply reflect the arbitrator's own notions of 
industrial justice" and would not "draw its essence from the 
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contract" itself. Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. As Chief Judge 
Becker has highlighted, an arbitrator's authority is quite 
broad, but it is not unlimited, because courts cannot 
"permit[ ] the arbitrator to transform the contractual 
arbitration into an equitable dispensation of his own brand 
of industrial justice, an endeavor expressly forbidden by the 
Supreme Court's decision in United Paperworkers Int'l 
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987)." News Am. Publ'n, 
Inc. v. Newark Typographical Union, Local 103, 921 F.2d 40, 
41 (3d Cir. 1990) (Becker, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 
Our decision here recognizes the sound principle that 
arbitration, while critically important to settling labor 
disputes, nonetheless cannot be used as a means to 
achieve illegitimate ends. Were we to permit this case to 
proceed to arbitration, we would be guilty of "wav[ing] a 
wand" over the arbitration proceedings by engaging in the 
fiction that an arbitrator could legitimately grant an award 
for the Union. Id. at 42. But when arbitration is placed 
within its proper limits, there is no escaping the conclusion 
that AmeriSteel, which is not bound by the substantive 
terms of the CBA, cannot be compelled to submit to 
arbitration because no arbitration award to the Union could 
receive judicial sanction. 
 
Accordingly, the March 17, 2000 order of the District 
Court will be AFFIRMED. 
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BECKER, Chief Judge, dissenting. 
 
It is surprising that thirty-seven years after John Wiley & 
Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), in which the 
Supreme Court first tackled the issue of successorship 
liability in labor cases, the law in this area is still unsettled. 
Wiley established that the notion of "substantial continuity 
in the identity of the business enterprise" is the principal 
criterion for determining successorship liability, and held 
that, in appropriate circumstances, successor employers 
can be required to arbitrate with their employees' union 
under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA) that the union had with the predecessor employer. 
Id. at 548, 551. 
 
In NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 
U.S. 272 (1972), and Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and 
Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974), the Court 
considered how the Wiley doctrine applied in different 
factual contexts. In American Bell, Inc. v. Federation of 
Telephone Workers of Pennsylvania, 736 F.2d 879, 888 (3d 
Cir. 1984), this Court used Wiley and Howard Johnson as 
the basis for developing a six-factored test for determining 
whether substantial continuity in the identity of the 
business enterprise is present: (i) continuity of work force, 
(ii) continuity of business operations, (iii) continuity of 
supervisory personnel, (iv) continuity of physical plant and 
location, (v) continuity in the nature of the product or 
services, and (vi) continuity in the methods of production, 
sales, or inventorying. 
 
As counsel for AmeriSteel had to concede at oral 
argument, the record in this case is crystal clear that in the 
transition of ownership of the York plant from Brocker 
Rebar to AmeriSteel, there has been not only substantial 
continuity but utterly no change in any of the American Bell 
factors except possibly for the methods of sales, which 
AmeriSteel's counsel represented had changed (although he 
was unclear as to how and to what degree). In other words, 
after closure for a three-day weekend, a new business 
appeared at 1700 Seventh Avenue in York that was the 
exact same enterprise as the one that had been there four 
days before in virtually all respects. Despite these 
uncontroverted facts and their close similarity to those in 
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Wiley, the majority holds that the successor corporation, 
AmeriSteel, is not bound by the arbitration provision of its 
predecessor's CBA. 
 
Judge Rendell's thoughtful opinion makes clear that 
resolving this case requires an analysis of Wiley, Burns, 
and Howard Johnson, the Supreme Court's cases 
addressing when a successor can be bound to the terms of 
a predecessor's CBA. Her opinion also demonstrates the 
difficulty of reconciling those cases and, implicitly at least, 
underscores the problems with choosing one path of 
reconciliation over another. I cannot join the majority's 
opinion because I believe that the case before us is 
controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Wiley, which 
involved a fact pattern that is similar in all relevant aspects 
to the facts in the case at bar, just as the other key cases 
involved quite different facts. While I do not suggest that 
AmeriSteel is duty-bound to accept the CBA that Brocker 
Rebar signed with Teamsters Local 430 (the union 
representing Brocker's employees), I do believe that Wiley 
mandates that we hold that AmeriSteel is bound to 
arbitrate with the union as to whether it is bound by any 
of the CBA's provisions. 
 
In other circumstances, the foregoing might well suffice 
for a dissenting opinion. But Wiley, Burns, and Howard 
Johnson are difficult to harmonize if not discordant in their 
overall tone and approach, and I disagree with the 
majority's attempt to fit these opinions together. I believe 
that the Supreme Court would do well to revisit this area 
which remains unclear twenty-seven years after Howard 
Johnson, the latest of the trilogy. Under these 
circumstances, I think it useful to explain my disagreement 




In Wiley, a publishing firm, Interscience, entered into a 
CBA with a union that represented its employees. 
Interscience then merged with another publishing firm, 
John Wiley & Sons, and ceased to do business as a 
separate entity. The union and Wiley were unable to agree 
what effect the merger had on the CBA, so the union 
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brought an action to compel arbitration under the CBA in 
order to determine the effect. Wiley pointed out that it did 
not sign the CBA, and argued that it therefore should not 
be bound by the CBA's arbitration clause. The Court, 
however, ultimately held that "in appropriate 
circumstances, present here, the successor employer may 
be required to arbitrate with the union under the 
agreement." Wiley, 376 U.S. at 548. As the majority rightly 
points out, Wiley also states that to send the case to 
arbitration (as it did), the union's demands under the 
substantive terms of the CBA must not be "so plainly 
unreasonable that . . . it can be seen in advance that no 
award to the Union could receive judicial sanction." Id. at 
555. Wiley nonetheless holds that "in appropriate 
circumstances," a successor employer can be held bound to 
the arbitration clause of its predecessor's CBA, and 
possibly can be held bound to the substantive terms of the 
CBA as well--despite the fact that (like AmeriSteel) the 
successor never agreed to be so bound and was not the 
alter ego of the predecessor. 
 
The key question for our purposes is what are these 
"appropriate circumstances" in which a CBA can be 
enforced against a successor employer. Wiley is brief in its 
description of these circumstances, but it does state that 
there must be "relevant similarity and continuity of 
operation across the change in ownership" so that there is 
"substantial continuity of identity in the business 
enterprise before and after [such] a change." Id. at 551. In 
Wiley, this continuity of identity and operation of the 
business enterprise was "adequately evidenced by the 
wholesale transfer of Interscience employees to the Wiley 
plant, apparently without difficulty." Id.  
 
The Court did not address the notion of "substantial 
continuity of identity in the business enterprise," in the 
next case in the trilogy, Burns, because it was clear in that 
case that there was absolutely no continuity between the 
predecessor and the successor. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 286 
("Here there was no merger or sale of assets, and there were 
no dealings whatsoever between Wackenhut and Burns."). 
In Howard Johnson, however, the Court elaborated on that 
concept. In that case, the Grissom family ran a Howard 
 
                                25 
 
 
Johnson's restaurant and motor lodge and entered into a 
CBA with the union representing their employees. The 
Grissoms thereafter sold to the Howard Johnson Company 
all of the personal property that they had been using to run 
the restaurant and lodge. By the terms of the sale 
agreement, Howard Johnson assumed four specific 
contracts relating to the operation of the restaurant and 
lodge but specifically declined to assume the CBA. Howard 
Johnson then hired its own workforce to staff the 
restaurant and lodge; it hired forty-five employees, only 
nine of whom had previously been working for the 
Grissoms at the restaurant (the Grissoms had had fifty- 
three employees), but hired none of the Grissoms' 
supervisory employees. See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 
250-52. 
 
The union filed suit, seeking an order to compel Howard 
Johnson to arbitrate the extent of its obligations to the 
former Grissom employees under the terms of the CBA. The 
Court ruled against the union, holding that the substantial 
continuity between the predecessor and successor 
corporations that was present in Wiley was missing in the 
case before it. See id. at 264-65. In particular, the Court 
noted that in Wiley the successor corporation hired all of 
the predecessor's employees and did not make substantial 
changes in its operation of the enterprise, as Interscience's 
former employees "continued to perform the same work on 
the same products under the same management at the 
same work place as before the change in the corporate 
employer." Id. at 258 (quoting Interscience Encyclopedia, 
Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 210, 218 (1970) (the arbitrator's opinion 
in Wiley)). In contrast, Howard Johnson selected and hired 
its own independent work force to run the restaurant and 
lodge. 
 
The case before us involves the same sort of "substantial 
continuity of identity in the business enterprise" that was 
present in Wiley but missing in Howard Johnson. The 
predecessor corporation, Brocker Rebar, negotiated a CBA 
with Local 430. Brocker Rebar then sold substantially all of 
its assets to AmeriSteel, including "the Business as a going 
concern and all of the assets, properties, and rights of the 
Sellers constituting the Business or used by the Sellers 
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therein, of every type and description, real and personal, 
tangible and intangible, wherever located." Asset Purchase 
Agreement between AmeriSteel and Brocker Rebar at 3. The 
assets purchased included Brocker Rebar's steel plant and 
equipment located at 1700 Seventh Avenue in York, where 
Local 430's members worked, along with all of Brocker 
Rebar's contracts and leases, except the CBA and 
individual employment contracts. 
 
Instead of selecting and training its own work force (as 
the successor did in Howard Johnson), AmeriSteel hired all 
but six of Brocker Rebar's former employees to work at the 
same plant (50 workers are needed to run the plant), doing 
the same jobs that they performed before the sale. 
AmeriSteel also hired Brocker Rebar's top supervisory 
personnel at the plant (again in contrast to Howard 
Johnson, where the successor hired none of the 
predecessor's supervisors). The York plant is situated in 
exactly the same location where it was before and produces 
the exact same product using the same inventory, the same 
equipment, the same physical set-up, and the same 
production methods that it did when it was Brocker Rebar's 
plant. In short, insofar as the plant's workers were 
concerned, virtually nothing changed at the plant when 
AmeriSteel took over except for the name on the door. 
 
In my view, this almost total continuity in Brocker 
Rebar's and AmeriSteel's operation of the York plant brings 
this case under Wiley's rule binding a successor 
corporation to the arbitration clause in its predecessor's 
CBA when there is almost total continuity of the business 
enterprise. As was the case in Wiley, the employees in the 
case at bar " `continue[ ] to perform the same work on the 
same products under the same management at the same 
work place as before the change in the corporate 
employer.' " Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 258 (quoting 
Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. at 218). 
Moreover, as the majority recognizes, the Supreme Court 
has held that the one potentially relevant difference 
between this case and Wiley--in Wiley  the predecessor was 
merged into the successor, while here there was no merger 
but a purchase of assets--is irrelevant in the context of 
successor liability. See Maj. Op. at 11 n.2; see also Fall 
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River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 
n.10 (1987); Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB , 414 U.S. 
168, 182 n.5 (1973). 
 
One implication of Wiley is that a successor that is 
bound by the arbitration clause of its predecessor's CBA 
may end up being bound by (at least some of) the 
substantive provisions of the CBA as well. The majority is 
concerned that a potential problem with such a regime is 
that corporations may be hesitant to purchase the assets of 
other corporations if they thought they might be saddled 
with the other corporations' labor agreements. I share that 
concern. However, Wiley struck a balance between 
corporate freedom and the protection of workers, 
recognizing that arbitration was an important means of 
maintaining labor peace and that "employees who are in 
fact retained in `[t]he transition from one corporate 
organization to another' " need to be afforded protection 
"from sudden changes in the terms and conditions of their 
employment." Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 264 (quoting 
and describing Wiley). The implication of the majority 
opinion is that Wiley is virtually a dead letter confined to its 
specific facts, essentially overruled. But it is not within our 
power to emasculate Wiley--only the Supreme Court can do 
that. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) 
(holding that the Court of Appeals was correct to apply a 
Supreme Court precedent despite the precedent's 
"infirmities, [and] its increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten 
foundations," because "it is this Court's prerogative alone to 




1. The majority attempts to refine its position with the argument that the 
"substantial continuity" concept in Wiley  "should properly be viewed as 
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the imposition of 
arbitration on an unconsenting successor." Maj. Op. at 9; see also Maj. 
Op. at 13-14 n.3. It adds, "Clearly, as Wiley  itself indicates, other 
factors 
must also be considered." Maj. Op. at 14 n.3. With all respect, I believe 
that this reading of Wiley conflicts with Howard Johnson's treatment of 
Wiley. In Howard Johnson, the Supreme Court applied the analytical 
precepts of Wiley, interpreting Wiley  as making "substantial continuity 
in 
the identity of the business enterprise" the centerpiece of the analysis 
of 
when a successor can be bound to arbitrate under a predecessor's CBA. 
 





Turning to a global analysis of the majority's decision, it 
is based upon the following two premises: (1) a successor 
corporation cannot be bound to the substantive terms of a 
predecessor's CBA unless it agrees to be so bound or is an 
"alter ego" of the predecessor; and (2) a successor 
corporation that is not bound by the substantive terms of 
a CBA should not be bound by an arbitration provision in 
that CBA either, because any decision by the arbitrator 
enforcing the CBA could not "receive judicial sanction" and 
thus arbitration could "serve no purpose." Maj. Op. at 3, 9, 
16. Because it is undisputed that AmeriSteel did not agree 
to be bound by the CBA and there is no evidence that 
AmeriSteel is the alter ego of Brocker Rebar, the majority 
concludes that AmeriSteel cannot be bound by the 
arbitration provision in Brocker Rebar's CBA with Local 
430. However, a simple exercise in deductive logic reveals 
that premises (1) and (2) lead inexorably to the conclusion 
that an arbitration clause of a CBA can never  be enforced 
against a successor corporation unless the successor 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Court held in Howard Johnson that the successor corporation was 
not bound to arbitrate under the predecessor's CBA because there was 
insufficient substantial continuity in the business enterprise, and the 
clear implication of the opinion is that, if there had been such 
substantial continuity, then the successor would have been so bound. I 
see nothing in Howard Johnson that would lead me to the conclusion 
that the Court would have held that the successor was not bound to 
arbitrate even if there had been such substantial continuity, because the 
"other factors" present in Wiley were missing there. See Howard 
Johnson, 417 U.S. at 264-65 ("Since there was plainly no substantial 
continuity of identity in the work force hired by Howard Johnson with 
that of the Grissoms, and no express or implied assumption of the 
agreement to arbitrate, the courts below erred in compelling the 
Company to arbitrate the extent of its obligations to the former Grissom 
emloyees."); see also id. at 258 (" Even more important, in Wiley the 
surviving corporation hired all of the employees of the disappearing 
corporation.") (emphasis added); id. at 263 (noting that the Court's 
holding "is reflected in the emphasis most of the lower courts have 
placed on whether the successor employer hires a majority of the 
predecessor's employees in determining the legal obligations of the 
successor in S 301 suits under Wiley"). 
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agreed to be bound by the CBA or is the predecessor's alter 
ego. I cannot accept the majority's reasoning because its 
logical consequence flatly contradicts the holding of Wiley, 
see supra Part I. 
 
Although the majority denies that it has relegated Wiley 
to the dustbin of history, it is abundantly clear from its 
opinion that it is doing just that. In order to get around the 
fact that Wiley's holding is implicated in the case at bar 
because of the very close similarity of fact patterns in this 
case and Wiley, the majority concludes that (1) Wiley is in 
"direct" and "irreconcilable conflict" with Burns because 
"Burns endorses the idea that unwilling successors cannot 
be bound" by "the substantive terms of pre-existing CBAs"; 
(2) Howard Johnson "downplays the significance of Wiley" 
while "tak[ing] an expansive view of Burns," thus strongly 
reaffirming Burns while casting Wiley  into doubt; so (3) 
Burns's dicta rather than Wiley's holding provides the 
relevant rule for this case because Burns's dicta provides 
"more persuasive guidance" than Wiley's "limited holding," 
whose "status [is] not entirely clear." Maj. Op. at 11, 12, 14, 




First, the majority's finding of an irreconcilable conflict 
between Wiley and Burns depends upon its erroneous 
characterization of Burns as establishing"the clear 
mandate . . . that an unconsenting successor employer 
cannot be bound by the substantive terms of a CBA 
negotiated by its predecessor." Maj. Op. at 16. The majority 
relies on the following language in Burns: 
 
       These considerations, evident from the explicit 
       language and legislative history of the labor laws, 
       underlay the Board's prior decisions, which until now 
       have consistently held that, although successor 
       employers may be bound to recognize and bargain with 
       the union, they are not bound by the substantive 
       provisions of a collective-bargaining contract negotiated 
       by their predecessors but not agreed to or assumed by 
       them. 
 
Burns, 406 U.S. at 284. 
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When this passage is considered in its entirety, it 
becomes clear that this is not Burns's holding and that to 
read it as establishing a "clear mandate" is a 
misinterpretation of Burns. As I read Burns, its holding is 
much more narrow, constrained by the Court's caution that 
its "[r]esolution [of the case] turns to a great extent on the 
precise facts involved here." Id. at 274. Unlike in Wiley, the 
Court in Burns did not recite an explicit holding; rather, the 
Court's actual conclusions in Burns are narrowly tailored to 
the particular facts of that case and carefully avoid any 
broad, sweeping statements of what the law is in this area. 
The overarching focus of the Court's reasoning in Burns is 
to show that Wiley does not control in Burns's fact situation 
because of the differences in the predecessor-successor 
relationships and in the legal claims made by the unions. 
See id. at 285-87, 291 (setting out the Court's own 
conclusions, which center on distinguishing Wiley). In sum, 
Burns does not "clear[ly] mandate . . . that an unconsenting 
employer cannot be bound by the substantive terms of a 
CBA negotiated by its predecessor." Maj. Op. at 16. 
 
The majority further concludes that if a predecessor and 
successor explicitly agree that the predecessor's CBA will 
not be binding on the successor, "Burns teaches that we 
must respect that agreement." Maj. Op. at 15. I do not 
understand Burns to support this conclusion, and in fact 
this reading of Burns conflicts with the majority's own 
characterization of the law in this area. As the majority 
itself observes, Wiley recognized that "an unconsenting 
successor" can owe an "extra-contractual duty," grounded 
in " `the policy of our national labor laws,' " to arbitrate with 
a union under the predecessor's CBA. Maj. Op. at 8 
(quoting Wiley, 376 U.S. at 548). It is clear that this duty, 
if implicated, is owed by the successor to the union, since 
the duty requires the successor to arbitrate with the union 
and the union can sue the successor to enforce the duty. 
However, the majority seems to believe that the successor's 
extra-contractual duty to the union can be abrogated by an 
express contractual provision in an agreement between the 
successor and its predecessor, with which the union was in 
no way involved. See Maj. Op. at 17, 20 ("[T]he specific 
contractual provisions between [AmeriSteel and Brocker 
Rebar] did in fact not merely `shed' the prior agreement 
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containing the arbitration provisions, but contracted them 
away[.]"). I find no support in either Supreme Court 
precedent or legal reasoning for the position that an extra- 
contractual duty owed to an entity can be nullified by a 
contract to which that entity is not a party. Therefore, I 
believe that the provision in the AmeriSteel-Brocker Rebar 
sales agreement expressly repudiating the CBA is irrelevant 




The majority's treatment of Howard Johnson is similarly 
flawed because it is based on the view that Howard 
Johnson "downplays the significance of Wiley," and "takes 
an expansive view of Burns." Maj. Op. at 14. On this basis, 
the majority implicitly holds that Burns effectively overruled 
Wiley. See Maj Op. at 16 ("[W]hile the validity of Burns 
cannot be doubted, Burns nonetheless conflicts with the 
implications of Wiley. . . . Accordingly, we believe the clear 
mandate of Burns -- that an unconsenting successor 
employer cannot be bound by the substantive terms of a 
CBA negotiated by its predecessor -- provides more 
persuasive guidance than the limited holding in Wiley."). I 
cannot agree with this reasoning. 
 
The majority concedes that the centerpiece of Howard 
Johnson's analysis involved applying the precepts of Wiley 
to the facts before the Court. See Maj. Op. at 13. I note that 
this is hardly consistent with the view that Howard 
Johnson "downplays the significance of Wiley." 
Furthermore, if Burns effectively overruled Wiley, then why 
would Howard Johnson (decided after Burns) use Wiley's 
analytical structure to reach its decision? If the majority's 
analysis is correct, then surely the Howard Johnson Court 
would have simply stated that Burns overruled Wiley and 
then based its decision on Burns's "holding" that 
unconsenting successor employers (who are not an alter 
ego of the predecessor) are never bound by the substantive 
terms of a predecessor's CBA. The Supreme Court has not 
been reluctant to overrule its own decisions when satisfied 
that they were wrong or based on outdated or anachronistic 
reasoning. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 
(1997). Tellingly, however, Howard Johnson did not do this, 
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but instead rested its decision upon Wiley's analytical 
structure. The clear implication of this, I believe, is that the 
Howard Johnson Court did not understand Burns to have 
overruled Wiley. I thus cannot understand how the majority 
now purports to hold implicitly that Wiley is overruled. 
 
Moreover, Howard Johnson's description of Wiley's 
holding as a "guarded, almost tentative statement," see 
Maj. Op. at 14 (quoting Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 256) 
is not made in the context of downplaying the Wiley's 
significance, but instead is actually a laudatory comment 
praising Wiley's careful reasoning. This description of 
Wiley's holding is made in the course of the Court's 
observation that, in every case in this area (including Burns 
and Howard Johnson itself), "we must necessarily proceed 
cautiously, in the traditional case-by-case approach of the 
common law. . . . [E]mphasis on the facts of each case as 
it arises is especially appropriate." Howard Johnson, 417 
U.S. at 256. Howard Johnson then reaffirms Burns's 
statement that Burns's decision " `turn[ed] to a great extent 
on the precise facts involved here' " (hardly an "expansive 
view" of Burns), and concludes that this sentiment applies 
equally well to all cases in this area of the law. Id. (quoting 
Burns, 406 U.S. at 274) Howard Johnson interprets Wiley's 
"guarded, almost tentative statement of its holding" as 
demonstrating that the Wiley Court was properly aware of 
the need for the Court to constrain its holding to the 
particular facts of the case. Id. In short, Howard Johnson 
does not bury Wiley, but praises it. 
 
Finally, Howard Johnson specifically notes that its 
interpretation of Wiley (based on the notion of "substantial 
continuity of identity in the business enterprise," see supra 
Part I) preserved for Wiley a substantial role in the 
protection of union members' rights: 
 
       This interpretation of Wiley is consistent also with the 
       Court's concern with affording protection to those 
       employees who are in fact retained in "[t]he transition 
       from one corporate organization to another" from 
       sudden changes in the terms and conditions of their 
       employment, and with its belief that industrial strife 
       would be avoided if these employees' claims were 
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       resolved by arbitration rather than by "the relative 
       strength . . . of the contending forces." 
 
Id. at 264 (quoting Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549). I think the 
above passage clearly communicates the Court's intention 
in Howard Johnson that Wiley should continue to protect 
employees from "sudden changes in the terms and 
conditions of their employment" in situations like the one 
before us--where there is a change in corporate ownership 
but the employees and the running of the business remain 
overwhelmingly the same. Again, this is just not consistent 
with an interpretation of Howard Johnson as"downplay[ing] 




I think that a much better reconciliation of the trilogy can 
be developed from a passage in Howard Johnson  discussing 
the concept of successorship that the majority quotes early 
in its opinion but then promptly ignores. See  Maj. Op. at 7. 
In this passage, Howard Johnson states that the lower 
court's division of issues into (1) whether Howard Johnson 
was a successor employer, and (2) whether a successor is 
required to arbitrate under its predecessor's CBA, was 
artificial and unhelpful, because "successor" is not a 
monolithic concept. 
 
       The question whether Howard Johnson is a "successor" 
       is simply not meaningful in the abstract. Howard 
       Johnson is of course a successor employer in the sense 
       that it succeeded to operation of a restaurant and 
       motor lodge formerly operated by the Grissoms. But 
       the real question in each of these "successorship" 
       cases is, on the particular facts, what are the legal 
       obligations of the new employer to the employees of the 
       former owner or their representative? The answer to 
       this inquiry requires analysis of the interests of the 
       new employer and the employees and of the policies of 
       the labor laws in light of the facts of each case and the 
       particular legal obligation which is at issue, whether it 
       be the duty to recognize and bargain with the union, 
       the duty to remedy unfair labor practices, the duty to 
       arbitrate, etc. There is, and can be, no single definition 
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       of "successor" which is applicable in every legal context. 
       A new employer, in other words, may be a successor 
       for some purposes and not for others. 
 
Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 262 n.9 (emphasis added). In 
my view, this passage, along with Burns's admonition that 
its decision "turns to a great extent on the precise facts 
involved here," 406 U.S. at 274, serves as a clear warning 
to lower courts not to read these opinions as providing 
expansive rules about successors in general; instead, the 
rules of these cases should always be understood in the 
context of the facts of the particular case. The majority 
appears to recognize this point when it quotes from the 
above passage and states that "labeling AmeriSteel a 
`successor employer' to Brocker Rebar does little to help 
resolve the issue in this case." Maj. Op. at 7. But the 
majority then ignores its own direction when it interprets 
Burns as making a general pronouncement that successors 
are never bound by the substantive terms of their 
predecessors' CBAs, thus treating all successorship 
situations as legally identical. 
 
I think the best reconciliation of the Wiley-Burns-Howard 
Johnson trilogy is that the cases set out a"sliding scale" for 
what types of burdens can be imposed on what types of 
successors. That is, the successorship relationships in 
these three cases were very different, and the burdens 
imposed on the successors varied with the corresponding 
strength of the successor relationship, thus providing an 
outline for deciding future cases. In Burns, there was a very 
weak relationship of succession between the corporations-- 
as the Court noted, "there was no merger or sale of assets, 
and there were no dealings whatsoever between Wackenhut 
[the predecessor] and Burns [the successor]," Burns, 406 
U.S. at 286; the successor merely took over the security job 
that the predecessor had performed and hired a portion of 
guards who had been employed by the predecessor. In a 
situation with such a weak succession relationship, the 
Court held that the successor corporation only had the 
duty to bargain with the union representing the employees, 
and was not bound by the substantive terms of the 
predecessor's CBA. 
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In Wiley, there was a very strong relationship of 
succession between the corporations--the predecessor 
merged into the successor--so the Court held that the 
successor was bound by the arbitration provision of the 
predecessor's CBA, and, as the majority recognizes, 
implicitly recognized that the successor corporation could 
be bound by the substantive terms of the predecessor's 
CBA as well (if the arbitrator were to so decide). The 
relationship of succession in Howard Johnson was not as 
strong as in Wiley--while there was a sale of assets by the 
predecessor to the successor, there was not nearly as much 
continuity of business operations as there was in Wiley (or 
here)--so the Court held that the successor was not bound 
to arbitrate under the predecessor's CBA.2  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This approach to interpreting the trilogy has the added benefit of 
clarifying a cryptic piece of dicta on the successorship issue in Fall 
River 
Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987). Fall River 
addressed the question whether Burns's holding that a successor 
corporation has a duty to bargain with the union that represents the 
predecessor's employees extended to a situation in which the union had 
been certified by the employees long before the transition in ownership. 
In discussing the background of the successorship doctrine, the Court 
said the following about Burns: 
 
       We observed in Burns that, although the successor has an 
       obligation to bargain with the union, it "is ordinarily free to set 
       initial terms on which it will hire the employees of a 
predecessor," 
       and it is not bound by the substantive provisions of the 
       predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement. 
 
Id. at 40 (citations omitted). 
 
The first thing to note about this passage is that it clearly plays no 
part in Fall River's holding; it is simply a description of Burns 
contained 
in a general discussion of the development of successorship law, so it 
must be understood in that context. Although the majority contends that 
the statement it relies on from Fall River is only "arguably" dicta, Maj. 
Op. at 16, n.5, the majority fails to explain how this statement from Fall 
River was necessary to the decision in that case and therefore fails to 
offer any argument that it is not dicta. 
 
Some courts have interpreted this passage as standing for the 
proposition that a successor may never be held bound to the substantive 
terms of a predecessor's CBAs unless the successor consents or is the 
alter ego of the predecessor, see, e.g., Southward v. South Cent. Ready 
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The question before us, then, is which type of successor, 
Wiley, Burns, or Howard Johnson , is AmeriSteel most like? 
As I argued in Part I, I believe that AmeriSteel is much 
more like a Wiley successor than a Howard Johnson 
successor. In other words, in my view there is sufficient 
"substantial continuity of identity in the business 
enterprise," between Brocker Rebar and AmeriSteel to 
justify holding that AmeriSteel is bound to the arbitration 
provision (and possibly to the substantive provisions) of 
Brocker Rebar's CBA with Local 430. Howard Johnson, 417 
U.S. at 259 (quoting Wiley, 376 U.S. at 551). 
 
Unfortunately, we derive no assistance from our own 
jurisprudence in resolving this dispute. The cases from 
within this circuit that interpret the Supreme Court case 
law can best be described as "dueling dicta": as I describe 
in the margin, no Third Circuit case has issued a square 
holding on this issue, although several have espoused one 
view or the other in passing.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Mix Supply Corp., 7 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 1993), and in fact the 
majority cites to this passage as support for its view. See Maj. Op. at 
15-16. I think it preferable to read the passage as making an observation 
about Burns-type successors particularly (i.e., these types of successors 
are not bound to the substantive terms of their predecessors' CBAs), 
rather than a point about all successors generally, because such a 
reading more closely fits with the carefully circumscribed reasoning and 
overall approach of the Wiley-Burns-Howard Johnson trilogy. Given that 
the Court was so careful to limit the holdings of each case in the trilogy 
to "the precise facts involved here," Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 256 
(quoting Burns, 406 U.S. at 274), it would seem incongruous to read Fall 
River as effecting, via dicta, an expansion of the holding of one of the 
trilogy beyond its "precise facts" into a general rule that covers all 
successors in the abstract--despite Howard Johnson's clear admonition 
that the concept of "a `successor' is simply not meaningful in the 
abstract." Id. at 262 n.9. Interpreting Fall River as effecting such an 
expansion would do violence to the principles and approach that 
underlie the Wiley-Burns-Howard Johnson trilogy. 
 
3. Compare Shaffer v. Mitchell Transp., Inc. , 635 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 
1980) ("The successorship doctrine simply allows the court to imply 
certain contractual duties from the predecessor's collective bargaining 
agreement and impose them on the successor."), Local Union No. 249 v. 
Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d 956, 960 (3d Cir. 1974) ("Analysis of the 
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I thus agree with the majority's conclusion that no 
previous Third Circuit case controls our decision in this 
case, see Maj. Op. at 17, and that our decision must be 
based on an in-depth interpretation of the Supreme Court 
trilogy rather on an earlier panel's off-the-cuff musing on 
this issue. And because our cases are contradictory on the 
issue of a successor's liabilities on a predecessor's CBA, I 
cannot agree with the majority that its decision"flows 
logically from our existing Circuit precedent." Maj. Op. at 
17. The case law cuts both ways, so a decision on this 
issue must stand solely on the substance of the analysis of 
the Wiley-Burns-Howard Johnson  trilogy. 
 
The case law from other courts of appeals also cuts in 
both directions, likewise noted in the margin.4 None of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Burns opinion convinces us, however, that its significance is largely 
limited to the particular facts of that case. . . . That there is no 
absolute 
bar to the enforcement of labor agreements against`successor' employers 
in section 301 actions, such as this, is amply illustrated by the decision 
in John Wiley and Sons, Inc. v. Livingston."), and Teamsters Local Union 
No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d 66, 69 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Burns 
did not deal with the question of when successorship doctrine may bind 
a transferee of assets to the procedural duty to submit to arbitration the 
question of whether the successor has somehow assumed any of the 
obligations of the old bargaining agreement."), with Stardyne, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 41 F.3d 141, 145 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that a "successor [is] 
not bound by its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement"), NLRB v. 
Rockwood Energy and Mineral Corp., 942 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 1991) 
("[A] successor is not bound by the substantive terms of its predecessor's 
labor agreement."), and United Steelworkers of Am. v. New Jersey Zinc 
Co., 828 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[A] successor employer is not 
automatically required to adopt its predecessor's collectively bargained 
agreements, see NLRB v. Burns."). 
 
4. Compare Stotter Div. of Graduate Plastics Co. v. District 65, 991 F.2d 
997, 1001 (2nd Cir. 1993) (holding that a successor corporation had a 
duty to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its predecessor's 
CBA 
because there was substantial continuity in the business enterprise), 
and Boeing Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 504 
F.2d 307, 314-16 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that "[w]e are confident, 
however, that even at the most Burns has not overruled the principles of 
Wiley," which give broad protection to employees "against sudden 
changes in the employment relationship" by enforcing against successors 
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cases from other circuits that the majority cites in support 
of its decision engages in the detailed, in-depth analysis of 
the troubled trilogy that this case calls for. Additionally, 
none of the cases from other Circuits recognizes, as the 
majority does, that Wiley's holding necessarily means that, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the duty to arbitrate under a predecessor's CBA), with Southward v. 
South Cent. Ready Mix Supply Corp., 7 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(stating that Burns and Fall River support the view that a successor is 
not bound to the substantive terms of its predecessor's CBA). 
 
Although the majority seeks to distinguish Stotter by the fact that the 
successor employer "entered into an agreement with the Union which 
adopted (with immaterial exceptions) the provisions of the [CBA]," Maj. 
Op. at 19 n.8, it is the prior CBA (coupled with successorship status), 
not the new CBA, that informs the ratio decidendi: 
 
       [The successor employer] asserts that it could not be made a party 
       to the arbitration because it was not a party to the contract with 
the 
       Union until May 29, 1990. . . . This argument essentially merges 
       with the broader question whether the arbitrator correctly 
       determined that GPC was a "successor" to Stotter. 
 
        In Wiley, the Supreme Court held that the surviving corporation 
       of a merger was obliged to arbitrate disputed issues under a 
       collective bargaining agreement between the merged (and no longer 
       existing) corporation and the union that represented the merged 
       corporation's employees, even though the surviving corporation had 
       not signed the contract and the contract did not contain an express 
       provision binding successors. 
 
Stotter, 991 F.2d at 1001. Stotter then undertook an extensive 
"substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise" analysis, 
and based its decision on its finding that "such continuity clearly 
exists" 
between the predecessor and the successor. See id.; see also Chartier v. 
3205 Grand Concourse Corp., 100 F. Supp. 2d 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
("[T]he Supreme Court has made it clear that one who succeeds to the 
business of an employer that was a party to a CBA, in appropriate 
circumstances, may be held to have succeeded also to its obligation to 
arbitrate under a CBA irrespective of any intention to do so."). 
 
The majority also argues that Boeing is"of limited utility" because it 
predates Fall River. Maj. Op. at 19, n.8. As I argue supra note 2, the 
language from Fall River that the majority relies on is not only dicta, 
but 
ambiguous dicta. Therefore, in this case I believe that it is Fall River 
that 
is of limited utility. 
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in the right circumstances, some substantive terms of a 
predecessor's CBA may be imposed on an unconsenting, 
non-alter-ego successor corporation. I add only that, 
whatever the viability of the preceding proposition, this case 
involves only arbitrating the applicability of the CBA, and in 
the thirty-seven years since Wiley, one area of doctrine that 
has grown stronger in that period is the Supreme Court's 
recognition of the importance of arbitration in a number of 




It is manifest from my dispute with the majority that, in 
its current state, the federal common law on this issue--in 
particular the Wiley-Burns-Howard Johnson trilogy--does 
not provide a clear answer in certain cases. If Wiley has 
been implicitly overturned by later Supreme Court cases, 
the Court should say so; but if, as I believe, it still plays a 
viable role in protecting the rights of "those employees who 
are in fact retained in `[t]he transition from one corporate 
organization to another' from sudden changes in the terms 
and conditions of their employment," Howard Johnson, 417 
U.S. at 264 (quoting Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549), the Court 
should reaffirm that fact. I hope that the Supreme Court 
will clarify the law in this area. In the meantime, I believe 
that the better interpretation of Supreme Court precedent is 
that the rule of Wiley is still in force and that rule should 
be applied to the case at bar to enforce the arbitration 
provision of the CBA against AmeriSteel. Indeed, if Wiley 
has continuing viability, its rule would apply here if it 
applied anywhere. I would reverse the judgment of the 
District Court and remand with directions to order this 
matter to proceed to arbitration. For the foregoing reasons, 
I respectfully dissent. 
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